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ABSTRACT Missile seekers are becoming increasingly more capable of using Doppler Beam Sharpening
(DBS) modes as part of the homing cycle, which requires new countermeasures against this mode. One type
of countermeasure, is to create false targets within the seeker DBS image. This paper proposes a jamming
technique to generate false targets at a precise location within a seeker DBS image, by both delaying and
adding a Doppler shift to received waveforms. The effects of tracking errors on the position of the false
target are analysed, both analytically and with simulations and used to assess the practical implementation
of the jamming scheme. An experimental DBS system was built to test the effectiveness of the jamming
scheme against a platform moving in steps and assess errors caused by incorrectly estimating the seeker
trajectory.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Doppler Beam Sharpening (DBS) is a technique that uses
the changing Doppler frequency caused by relative motion
between a platform and a target, to synthetically narrow the
main beam of the antenna and generate an image. It is a type
of imaging radar, often used for ground mapping and clutter
discrimination [1]. Whilst it is quite an old technique (dating
back to the 1950’s), it is now being used in missiles [2], naval
radars [3] and in the automotive industry [4], [5]. Missile
seekers benefit from using DBS, as it provides a crude imag-
ing capability by improving azimuth resolution without being
computationally expensive, like Synthetic Aperture Radars
(SAR). DBS images are typically much faster to obtain than
SAR images and easier to analyse, whereas SAR tends to
have a vastly superior azimuth resolution and focus. As a
generic example, DBS can be performed with a dwell time
in the order of tens of milliseconds, whereas SAR is in the
order of whole seconds [6].
Countermeasures against RF missile seekers have attracted
the interest of the Electronic Warfare community for decades.
For example, techniques against conventional monopulse
radars have been intensely studied. A monopulse radar is
a widely used tracking radar, employed by many modern
missile seekers and there are several methods to jam this type
of radar. One such method is the use of noise jamming. Paik
et al [7]–[9] have undertaken several studies into noise jam-
ming monopulse radars. They have investigated conditions
in which ‘break-lock’ of phased locked loops (PLL) in the
monopulse occurs when tracking a target.
Another method is to use deception jamming and Neri [10]
summarises a few methods of anti-monopulse deception jam-
ming techniques, such as cross-polarisation, cross-eye jam-
ming and the use of decoys. Cross-Eye Jamming (CEJ) aims
to create ‘worst-case’ angular errors in monopulse radars
due to glint [11]. The problem with cross-eye jamming is
that it requires highly accurate estimation and replication
of the seeker waveforms. Falk [12] discusses the princi-
ples of cross-eye jamming and explains how scattering of
the jamming waveform by ocean waves can severely affect
the performance of the jammer. A method of practically
implementing cross-eye jamming is retrodirective cross-eye
jamming, which is demonstrated in [13] and an extended
analysis of retrodirective cross-eye jamming is described in
[14]. A derivation of the cross-eye gain in the presence of
skin-returns is presented in [15].
In order for cross-eye jamming to be implemented success-
fully, high fidelity copies of the waveform from the victim
radar need to be obtained. The ability to create high fidelity
copies of waveforms and modify them comes from the use
of Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) systems. A
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DRFM can store and modify waveforms using high-speed
sampling and digital memory [16]. The DRFM enables
phase coherency, which enables coherent radar modes to be
jammed such as by creating false targets in SAR images. A
brief overview of using a DRFM to create false targets in
SAR images is found in [17]. There has been some active
research for creating false targets in SAR images. The work
in [18] investigated how to create false targets in a SAR
image by modulating the received waveform for a generic
scenario.
In addition to investigating narrow and broadband noise
jamming (which is beyond the scope of this paper), the
research in [19] used a varying time delay method to create
false targets in a SAR image. Using this method in practice is
difficult as it requires extremely precise timings in hardware.
A method to create false targets in a SAR image by mod-
ulating the received signal is shown for missile-borne SAR
in [20] and space-borne SAR in [21]. Both methods require
knowledge of the platform trajectory, as well as the ability to
coherently modify the received waveform.
Instead of broadband or narrowband jamming, which re-
quires higher jamming power due to the processing gains of
coherent radars, another method is to use Doppler or ‘phase
noise’ jamming. The research in [22] presents this idea. Here,
the jammer receives the seeker waveform and then multiplies
that waveform by video noise where the phase is randomly
distributed. The effect of this jamming is to create a distinct
noise band in the range bins (corresponding to the range-
resolution of the pulse), which spreads across all of the
Doppler bins.
A similar effect is observed in [23] where the authors
propose the idea of jittering the jammer hold-on time and
multiplying the phase of the received waveform by a noise
waveform. They also propose sampling only part of the
received waveform so the pulse width is less than the victim
radar waveform. This enables the jammer to transmit more
jittered pulses within a single PRI, to create a distinct noise
band at desired range and Doppler bands. Another method
of achieving a similar result is presented in [24]. Here the
authors propose using repeat jamming with a random delay
against a SAR GMTI (Ground Moving-Target Indication)
system.
Whilst not directly related to this paper, there is also some
research in jamming bistatic and multistatic SAR systems.
In [25], the authors propose transmitting a randomly jittered
copy of the received waveform from outside the scene area
to mask the presence of targets in the scene. This requires the
jammer receiver to be inside the scene area and the employ-
ment of a DRFM to store copies of the victim radar wave-
forms. In [26], the authors propose jamming a bistatic Inverse
Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) system by undersampling
the waveform of the victim radar in a sub-Nyquist manner.
The jammer receives a scattered echo from a moving target
and then transmits the undersampled jamming waveform at
the moving target in order for the jamming waveform to be
scattered towards the victim receiver. This form of deception
jamming aims to create multiple false targets with the number
of false targets being a function of the undersampling rate
used. The sub-Nyquist method to create multiple false targets
is also used in [27] against an ISAR system which uses
Compressive Sensing (CS).
There has been some unclassified research into optimising
the trajectory of a missile specifically to perform DBS which
is detailed in [28], [29] and [30]. In order for a jammer to
create a false target at a desired location within the seeker
DBS image, the jammer must know that the seeker is using
the DBS mode. As the signal processing for DBS is similar to
that of a pulse-Doppler radar, it is difficult to know when the
seeker is performing DBS. Detecting when the seeker would
be performing DBS is beyond the scope of this paper, but the
optimised trajectories give a potential method of detecting
when a seeker is using DBS.
There is very little literature on jamming DBS modes, but
previous work in [31] introduced the concept of creating false
targets in DBS images of a missile seeker using a varying
time delay method. For this method, the jammer receives the
incoming waveform and delays it before re-transmitting. If
the jammer delay time varies on a pulse per pulse basis, a
synthetic phase history can be created to place a false target
at a desired location.
Several jamming methods against conventional monopulse
radars and imaging radars such as SAR and ISAR have been
discussed so far. However, there is very little, if any, existing
literature that details how to create a false target at a specific
location within a DBS image. Nor does any of the literature
explain how positional errors in the false target are induced
by incorrectly estimating the platform trajectory. Previous
work in [32] introduced the jamming technique proposed in
this paper, but it did not provide a rigorous mathematical
detail of the technique, analyse errors caused by incorrect
seeker trajectory estimation, or use the experimental DBS
system used in this paper.
The research in this paper proposes a jamming technique to
generate false targets at a precise location within a seeker
DBS image, by both delaying and adding a Doppler shift
to received waveforms. The effects of tracking errors on the
position of the false target are analysed, both analytically and
with simulations and used to assess the practical implemen-
tation of the jamming scheme. An experimental DBS system
was built to test the effectiveness of the jamming scheme
against a platform moving in steps and assess errors caused
by incorrectly estimating the seeker trajectory.
II. GEOMETRY AND SIGNAL MODEL
Let us consider a missile seeker transmitting a signal
sT (t) = s(t)e
i2pifct (1)
flying along the x-axis of a 2D Cartesian coordinate system
with dynamics
x(t) = V t (2)
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and constant velocity V .
FIGURE 1: Missile Reference Frame
The signal reflected from a target located at a slant range
R0 and cross-range x0, as shown in Figure 1, can be ex-
pressed as
sR(t) = γR s(t− τ(t))e−i2pifcτ(t)ei2pifct (3)
where
τ(t) =
2R(t)
c
(4)
is the echo time delay and
R(t) =
√
(x0 − V t)2 +R02 (5)
is the instantaneous target distance from the missile. For
R0 >> x0 and t ≈ 0
R(t) ' R0
√
1− 2V tx0
R0
2 (6)
which after a first order Taylor approximation about t = 0
leads to
R(t) = R0 − V x0
R0
t (7)
and
τ(t) =
2R0
c
− 2V x0
cR0
t (8)
Finally, the signal received by the seeker after IQ demodula-
tion can be expressed as
sR(t) = γR s(t− τ(t))e−i 4piλ R0ei2pi
2V x0
λR0
t (9)
which after the narrowband approximation [33] becomes
sR(t) = γR s(t− 2R0
c
)e−i
4pi
λ R0ei2pi
2V x0
λR0
t (10)
where γR is the two-way attenuation factor. Eq. (10) shows
that the received signal is a delayed copy of the transmitted
signal shifted in Doppler of fD = 2V x0λR0 . DBS measures the
Doppler shift and obtains an estimate of the slant range to
find the cross-range coordinate of the target.
III. JAMMING THEORY AND METHOD
A. THEORY
This section develops the theory used to create a false target
at a specific location within the seeker DBS image, as well as
detailing how the position of the false target will change, if
incorrect seeker trajectory parameters (e.g. velocity or range)
are used by the jammer.
The signal model presented in Section II is now extended to
the case of a target capable of intercepting the signal trans-
mitted by the RF seeker to re-transmit a suitably modified
jamming version and place a false target in a desired location
of coordinates (x0+δx,R0+δR). Figure 2 details the scenario
with the position of the intended false target.
FIGURE 2: Missile Reference Frame With Jammer
In this paper, the jamming scheme outlined in Figure 3 is
proposed for which the jammer can generate false targets by
applying a time delay τj and a Doppler shift fJ = αfD to the
intercepted waveform. The goal of the jammer is to calculate
τj and the parameter α, based on the received signal, to place
the false target at the desired miss-distance in downrange and
cross-range.
FIGURE 3: Jamming Block Diagram
Let the transmitted signal sT (t) from the seeker be the
same of Eq. (1) where s(t) is an arbitrary complex envelope
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of the waveform. Whilst propagating towards the jammer,
sT (t) will experience a time delay
τ(t) =
R(t− τ(t))
c
=
R0
c
+
β
c
[t− τ(t)] (11)
with
β = −V x0
R0
(12)
which after a simple algebraic manipulation can be expressed
as
τ(t) =
R0
(c+ β)
+
βt
(c+ β)
(13)
The signal received by the jammer is therefore
jR(t) = γ sT
(
t− R0
(c+ β)
− βt
(c+ β)
)
(14)
where γ is a one way attenuation factor. The jammer would
then delay jR(t) by τj , to give an additive range component,
and induce a Doppler shift to then transmit
jT (t) = γJ sT
(
c
(c+ β)
t− cτj
(c+ β)
− R0
(c+ β)
)
×exp(i2pifcαt)
(15)
where γJ is the jammer amplitude factor. The second leg of
propagation back towards the seeker has the delay of
τ ′(t) =
R(t)
c
=
R0
c
+
βt
c
(16)
This gives the resulting jamming signal to be
sR(t) = γR sT
(
c
(c+ β)
[t− τ ′(t)]− cτj +R0
(c+ β)
)
× exp (i2pifcα[t− τ ′(t]) (17)
which, after replacing the value of τ ′(t) in Eq. (16), can be
written as
sR(t) = γR sT
(
c− β
(c+ β)
t− c
(c+ β)
[
2R0
c
+ τj
])
× exp (i2pifcαc− β
c
t
)
exp
(− i2pifcαR0
c
) (18)
After replacing the expression of sT (t) in Eq. (1), the signal
received at the seeker can be expressed as
sR(t) = γR s
(
c− β
c+ β
t− c
(c+ β)
[
2R0
c
+ τj
])
× exp
(
i2pifc
c− β
c+ β
t
)
exp
(
−i2pifc c
(c+ β)
[
2R0
c
+ τj
])
× exp (i2pifcαc− β
c
t
)
exp
(− i2pifcαR0
c
)
(19)
which after down-conversion becomes
sR(t) = γR s
(
c− β
c+ β
t− c
(c+ β)
[
2R0
c
+ τj
])
× exp
(
−i2pifc 2β
c+ β
t
)
exp
(
−i2pifc c
(c+ β)
[
2R0
c
+ τj
])
× exp (i2pifcαc− β
c
t
)
exp
(− i2pifcαR0
c
)
(20)
When β << c, the terms cc+β ' 1, 2βc+β ' 2βc and
c−β
c ' 1, and after the narrowband approximation [33] the
final waveform at the seeker becomes
sR(t) = γˆR s
(
t− 2R0
c
− τj
)
× exp
(
−i2pifc 2β
c
t
)
exp (i2pifcαt)
(21)
where all constant phase terms have been included in the
parameter γˆR. From Eq. (10), an ideal target located at
(x0 + δx, R0 + δR) would generate an echo signal
sR(t) = γR s
(
t− 2(R0 + δR)
c
)
× exp
(
−i4pi (R0 + δR)
c
)
exp
(
i2pi
2V (x0 + δx)t
λ(R0 + δR)
)
(22)
In order for the jammer to create the perfect false target,
the value of τj and α must be such that the total time delay
and Doppler shift at the seeker in Eq. (21) are the same as
that for in Eq. (22).
If
βJ = −V (x0 + δx)
(R0 + δR)
(23)
then α can be calculated by imposing the Doppler equality
−fc 2β
c
+ fcα = −fc 2βj
c
(24)
which leads to the final result
α =
2β
c
− 2βJ
c
=
2V (x0 + δx)
c(R0 + δR)
− 2V x0
cR0
(25)
Similarly, it is straightforward to show that
τj =
2δr
c
(26)
These results show that in order to generate a false target
in the desired cross-range location, the jammer must create
a synthetic phase history to mimic the phase history a target
would have, if it was at that location. This requires the jam-
mer to have perfect knowledge of its position with respect to
the seeker. It is finally important to observe that the analytical
results presented in this section are general and apply to any
type of waveform design s(t).
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B. PULSED DBS THEORY
Consider a pulsed waveform,
s(t) =
M−1∑
m=0
x(t−mPRI) (27)
consisting of M pulses of duration τ . Following the result
obtained in Eq. (21), the signal received by the seeker would
be
sR(t) = γˆR
M−1∑
m=0
x
(
t−mPRI − 2R0
c
− τj
)
× exp
(
−i2pifc 2β
c
t
)
exp (i2pifcαt)
(28)
where PRI is the Pulse Repetition Interval. If the time
domain is sampled in a fast-time, slow-time form with t =
t1 + kPRI and 0 < t1 < PRI , the received signal can be
expressed as
sR(t1, k) = γˆR
M−1∑
m=0
x
(
t1 − (m− k)PRI − 2R0
c
− τj
)
× exp
(
−i2pifc 2β
c
t1
)
exp
(
−i2pifc 2β
c
kPRI
)
× exp (i2pifcαt1) exp (i2pifcαkPRI)
(29)
For a fixed range bin, the phase terms containing t1 will be
constant from pulse to pulse. This therefore means they can
be placed into the term γˆR, which contains the other constant
phase terms. It is straightforward to show that when the pulse
width is less than the PRI (τ < PRI), the received pulse train
at the seeker is
sR(t1, k) = γˆR x
(
t1 − 2R0
c
− τj
)
exp
(
−i2pifc 2β
c
kPRI
)
exp (i2pifcαkPRI)
(30)
Eq.(30) shows that for a pulsed waveform, introducing a
false target in a fixed range bin is equivalent to introducing
an incremental phase shift from pulse to pulse. This will be
exploited for the experimental demonstration of the results
where a ‘stop and go’ method is employed to carry out
measurements without the use of a DFRM.
C. ERRONEOUS TRAJECTORY ESTIMATION
The algorithm proposed in this paper relies on estimates of
the position and velocity of the missile which are provided
by a tracking radar co-located with the jammer. The tracking
radar may have bias in the position and velocity estimates
of the missile. The tracking radar bias can be evaluated at
calibration stage and compensated for before passing the
information to the jammer. However, in cases where the bias
cannot be eliminated, the jammer will use incorrect values of
x0,R0 and V . A false target will still be created, but not at the
desired location. The performance of the false target position
is now presented. Each variable in Eq. (25) can be incorrectly
estimated by varying amounts. Incorporating these errors into
in Eq. (25) gives:
α =
2
c
[
VV (xx0 + δx)
(RR0 + δR)
− VV xx0
RR0
]
(31)
The scalar variables x, R and V are the numerical ratio
between the estimated value of the variable and the true
value for cross-range, downrange and velocity respectively.
For example, if the true velocity of the missile is 300m/s but
the jammer estimates it to be 360m/s, then V =
Vj
V = 1.2.
Incorporating this into the signal in Eq. (21), the resultant
signal would be:
sR(t) = γˆR s
(
t− 2R0
c
− τj
)
exp
(
−i2pifc 2βt
c
)
× exp
(
i2pifct
2
c
[
VV (xx0 + δx)
(RR0 + δR)
− VV xx0
RR0
])
(32)
with instantaneous frequency
fd =
2
λ
(
VV (xx0 + δx)
(RR0 + δR)
− VV xx0
RR0
+
V x0
R0
)
(33)
If there were no errors in the missile trajectory, Eq. (32)
would simplify to Eq. (22). To obtain the cross range position
of the target, the seeker would then invert the Doppler equa-
tion to map for the cross-range position at each range bin.
Therefore the cross-range position for the false target will be
xˆ = (R0 + δR)
(
V(xx0 + δx)
(RR0 + δR)
− Vxx0
RR0
+
x0
R0
)
(34)
This equation predicts how the position of the false target will
change with erroneous trajectory estimation for a linearly
moving missile.
Figure 4 shows how the cross-range position of the false
target will shift when x, R and V  from Eq. (31) are
systematically varied for a seeker, where V = 272 m/s, R0
= 20km, x0 = 2km and δx = 400m. For example, the plot for
the velocity error uses
α =
2
c
[
VV (x0 + δx)
(R0 + δR)
− VV x0
R0
]
(35)
Figure 4 shows that an erroneous velocity estimation will
yield the largest errors in the position of the false target. The
purpose of jamming a missile or tracking radar is to avoid
being hit by the missile or tracked by the enemy. Therefore,
it is likely to be more desirable to have a false target at a
location further away than intended, than closer, to avoid
being hit. Using this principle, Figure 4 shows it is better
to underestimate the cross-range and down-range variables
and overestimate the velocity magnitude variable. This is a
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general result, which will hold when R0 >> x0.
FIGURE 4: Resultant Cross-Range Position with Varying
Errors when V = 272 m/s, R0 = 20km, x0 = 2km and δx
= 400m.
In order for the jammer to correctly modify the wave-
forms, data from a tracking radar will need to be fed into
the jamming system. This would likely be from the on-
board surveillance and tracking radars that military ships will
use. To better understand the size and scale of the errors,
parameters for a generic tracking radar have been used to
calculate the expected magnitude of measurement errors (for
a single pulse) that a radar could theoretically have. A tracker
could potentially improve on these errors, so the equations
are used to gain an understanding of the magnitude of the
respective errors, in a general case. These errors occur when
taking various measurements about a target in the presence
of Gaussian white noise. General equations for measurement
errors for azimuth, range and Doppler are listed as follows
[34]:
∆x =
2Rsin
(
θ3dB
2
)
√
2SNR
(36)
∆R =
c
2B
√
2SNR
(37)
∆fd =
λ
∆t
√
2SNR
(38)
Using the parameters in Table 1 and Eq. (36), (37) and (38), it
can be seen that the largest error of the three measurements is
that for the cross-range estimate, especially at larger ranges.
With instantaneous bandwidths in the order of 100s of MHz,
the range errors induced by poor a SNR are small (less
than the resolution cell) and almost negligble when the
range component is in the order of several kilometres or
larger. Whilst the biggest effect on the position of the false
target is from the velocity estimation, the expected errors
in the Doppler measurement result in the error scalar, V ,
potentially being in the order of 1.02 for a missile travelling
at 270m/s.
TABLE 1: Generic Tracking Radar Parameters
Variable Symbol Value
Carrier Frequency fc 3GHz
Bandwidth B 100MHz
Pulse Width T 10µs
Pulse Repetition Frequency PRF 20kHz
3dB Horizontal Beamwidth θ 2◦
Dwell Time ∆t 1ms
Assumed SNR SNR 3dB
Range R 20km
Azimuth Error ∆x 415.27m
Range Error ∆R 1.78m
Doppler Error ∆fd 59.50Hz
Whilst a tracking radar would improve on these measure-
ment errors, in a contested battlespace, the on-board tracking
radar could itself be victim of jamming. This means that the
tracking errors may therefore be larger than the theoretical
measuring errors and similar to that of Figure 4.
IV. PRACTICALLY MODIFYING A WAVEFORM
In order to test the theory developed in this paper and demon-
strate the practical implementation of it, real measurements
were taken in a laboratory. The aim of the measurements
was twofold; to show that the developed theory is correct
and false targets appear in the correct location, as well
as to show that the positions of the false target change
accordingly, when various parameters of the seeker trajectory
are erroneously estimated. The aims of the experiment were
met using physical antenna movement by sliding an antenna
across an aperture with respect to a stationary target. The
movement was carried out in steps and was used to simulate
the linear motion of a missile to test the developed theory.
To do this, a linear belt driven rail was constructed to slide an
antenna across an aperture to simulate the seeker trajectory
as shown in Figure 5. The rail used is 2m long and is driven
by a ‘NEMA 17’ stepper motor. The motor used had 0.9◦
resolution with 400 steps per 360◦ revolution. The breakout
board used to interface the Arduino to the stepper motor was
an A4988 ‘StepStick’ driver board.
To reduce the complexity of the measurements, a ‘stop and
go’ method was used between pulses, instead of continuously
moving the antenna and transmitting. Using this method
removed the requirement for instantaneous processing of the
transmitted and received waveforms as well as removing
the requirement to move the antenna at high speeds. The
‘stop and go’ method also enabled the simulation of higher
velocities or varying PRIs as the antenna can be moved
according to the distance the seeker would travel between
PRIs. For example, if the PRF is 10kHz and the missile
speed 300m/s, the antenna can be moved 3mm between
each transmitted pulse. Therefore by controlling the distance
moved by the antenna between pulses and assuming a fixed
6 VOLUME 4, 2016
Author et al.: Preparation of Papers for IEEE TRANSACTIONS and JOURNALS
PRF, the speed can be simulated as the Doppler shifts are not
observed in fast time, but in slow time between pulses. The
‘stop and go’ method has been used solely for the scope of
demonstrating the jamming technique in the laboratory. As
shown in Eq. (22), a higher velocity or varying PRF does not
affect the analytical performance of the proposed solution
as long as the narrowband approximation in Eq. (21) holds
(which is commonly the case for the velocities of the missiles
under consideration in this research). From Eq. (30) and for a
fixed range bin, the Doppler shift can be induced with respect
to slow-time (kPRI) and not fast time. As shown in Figure 6,
the range bin will be fixed for the experiment, enabling the
‘stop and go’ method to be used.
The accuracy of the rail movement between pulses was tested
and it was found that the rail had an average deviation of
0.1mm and a standard deviation of 0.13mm. For a carrier
frequency of 5GHz with a wavelength of 60mm, these errors
mean that the movement errors are 0.16% of the wavelength
and therefore not significant.
Figures/Rail_Pic1.jpg
FIGURE 5: Experimental DBS Rail
For the measurements, two pyramidal horn antennas were
used as shown in Figure 6. The measurements were com-
pleted in the far-field region of the antennas. No beam
steering was used (mechanically or electronically) during the
measurement, but the receiving antenna was kept inside the
main beam of the transmitter for all of the transmitted pulses.
The horizontal beamwidth used is calculated by [35]:
θh =
51λ
W
=
51× 0.06
0.09
= 34◦ (39)
Where W is the width of the antenna at the flared end. This
means at a range of 4m, the cross-range resolution of the real
beam is 2R sin
(
θh
2
)
and therefore ≈ 2.34m.
The waveforms were generated with a Universal Software
Radio Peripheral (USRP) made by National Instruments (NI-
2943R). LabVIEW was used to control both the USRP and
the Arduino and Matlab was embedded into the LabView
program to design the waveforms. Table 2 shows the signal
variables for the measurements and Figure 6 shows the
geometry of the measurement.
TABLE 2: USRP Variables
Variable Symbol Value
Carrier Frequency fc 5GHz
Bandwidth B 30MHz
Pulse Width τ 10µs
Sampling Rate Fs 80MHz
Assumed Missile Velocity V 60m/s
Pulse Repetition Interval PRI 50µs
Number of Pulses M 128
FIGURE 6: Experimental Layout
By using a slightly modified version of Eq. (30), a false
target can be induced at a desired location by modifying
the transmitted waveform to incorporate an incremental shift.
The modification was necessary due to one-way (instead of
two-way) propagation, as shown in Figure 6. In order to
create an ‘echo’ for reference, two pulses were transmitted.
The first pulse was unmodified (where α and τj are set to
zero) for the ‘echo’. The second pulse was modified using
the corresponding values for τj and α to create the false
target. The variables of the trajectory (V , R0 and x0) and the
carrier frequency, were assumed to be known to the jammer.
For the measurements, a Linear Frequency Modulated (LFM)
or ‘Chirp’ waveform was used to created the bandwidth of
30MHz as listed in Table 2. This meant that
x(t) = eipiγt
2
Rect
(
t
τ
)
(40)
where
Rect
(
t
τ
)
=
{
1, 0 < t < τ
0, Elsewhere
(41)
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Using the derived jamming scheme, the first step was to
create a false target at an additional cross-range only, without
an additive range (τJ = 0). Figures 7 and 8 show that a target
can be induced to have a cross-range position of 10m. The
cross-range position of the antenna was 2.65m which meant
that δx = 7.35m to give the final cross-range position of 10m.
These figures demonstrate the effectiveness of the jamming
scheme to create a false target at the desired location in cross-
range.
FIGURE 7: Cross-Range Profile of of ‘Echo’ and False
Target When τJ = 0 and δx = 7.35m
FIGURE 8: Range - Cross-Range Map of ‘Echo’ and False
Target When τJ = 0 and δx = 7.35m
An additional downrange component can be added to the
false target by delaying the transmitted pulse. In this case, the
desired cross-range value was nominally 60m and downrange
value was 35m. From Figure 6, the position of the transmit
antenna (relative to the receive antenna) was 2.65m in cross-
range and 4m in downrange. Therefore, to create a false target
at 60m in cross-range and 35m in downrange, the values of δx
and 2τJc were 57.35m and 31m, respectively. Figure 9 shows
the cross-range (Doppler) profile of the false target at 60m
cross-range and Figure 10 shows a false target at 60m cross-
range and 35m in downrange.
FIGURE 9: Cross-Range Profile of False Target When 2τJc =
31 and δx = 57.35m
FIGURE 10: Range - Cross-Range Map of ‘Echo’ and False
Target When 2τJc = 31m and δx = 57.35m
Following from Figure 4 and by using Eq. (34), Figure 11
shows how the cross-range position for the generated target
will change with each error of velocity magnitude, cross-
range and down-range. The figure was calculated with the
intended false target position of 35m in downrange and 60m
in cross-range. The Figure is used to demonstrate how the
error scalars can be used to predict the cross-range position.
To verify Figure 11, several more measurements were
taken and errors were systematically introduced as shown
in Table 3. The cross-range prediction (xˆ) was calculated
using Eq. (34). The table details the resultant cross-range
position should the jamming equation include errors from
one particular error per measurement. For example, the top
line of the Table states that the velocity scalar, V has a value
of 2. This means that if the jammer uses the same variables
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FIGURE 11: Resultant Cross-Range Position For Each Error
Scalar
as detailed in Table 2, every other variable was assumed to be
correct, but the jammer modified the waveform to include a
velocity of 120m/s and not 60m/s.
TABLE 3: Error Variables
Error Symbol Scalar Value xˆ Prediction xˆ Result
Velocity V 2 96.85m 97.52m
Range R 2 65.42m 66.09m
Cross-Range x 4 -1.515m -0.85m
The cross-range (remapped Doppler) profiles for each
of the measurements are shown in Figures 12, 13 and 14,
respectively. For each of the plots, the intended cross-range
position of the target (if there were no errors) was 60m. These
three results show that the predictions in Figure 11 will hold
when the scenario is scaled up to a more realistic scenario,
shown in Figure 4.
FIGURE 12: Cross-Range Position of False Target with
Erroneous Initial Seeker Cross-Range Estimation
FIGURE 13: Cross-Range Position of False Target with
Erroneous Initial Seeker Downrange Estimation
FIGURE 14: Cross-Range Position of False Target with
Erroneous Initial Seeker Velocity Estimation
V. CONCLUSION
A jamming technique to insert a false target at a desired
location within the seeker image has been developed and
tested with an experimental setup. We have shown that in
order to place a false target in a desired location, the jammer
only needs to apply a delay and a Doppler shift to the received
signal. A further investigation should be undertaken using a
DRFM in real-time to test the jamming scheme in a more
realistic scenario.
The expected trajectories for the missile will generally be
such that R0 >> x0 which means the cross-range compo-
nent of the trajectory will be small, relative to the downrange
component. Therefore, errors in cross-range estimation yield
smaller errors in the false target position than for downrange
estimate errors. The largest source of error in the false target
position is that of the velocity parameter. As a general result,
the experimental and simulated results therefore show it
would be better to concentrate resources on estimating the
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velocity rather than downrange or cross-range parameters of
the incoming missile.
Future studies should be undertaken to assess how this could
change for a different type of trajectory that a missile using
DBS could take. The research should also be continued to
assess the probability of the seeker accepting or rejecting the
false targets generated using the described algorithm.
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